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Scottish	wind	farms	and	the	monetary	incentives	to
switch	off
Throughout	Europe,	wind	power	has	been	growing	rapidly,	indeed	it	has	achieved	a	quarter	of	total	electricity
production	in	Germany,	for	example.	However,	wind	power	generation	has	two	problems-	it	fluctuates	widely	as	the
wind	speed	differs	and	it	is	often	windiest	in	areas	remote	from	the	population.	Because	electricity	supplied	must
always	equal	electricity	demanded,	the	system	operator	needs	to	maintain	a	careful	balance	between	what	is
flowing	from	generators	through	the	pylons	and	demand.	Given	this	context,	significant	growth	in	wind	farm
generation	in	remote	parts	of	Scotland,	poorly	connected	to	more	populous	areas,	has	created	a	problem.
“Scottish	wind	farm	paid	£96M	to	switch	off”	is	an	example	of	a	newspaper	headline	that	particularly	irks	people
who	find	wind	turbines	ugly,	as	well	as	being	deeply	puzzling	to	many.	Why	pay	someone	to	switch	off?
The	Western	Link	is	an	undersea	cable	linking	Scottish	wind	farms	to	England	that	aims	to	reduce	or	eliminate	such
problems.	We	ask:	has	it	worked,	and	if	not,	why?	Our	research	finds	it	has	only	been	a	very	limited	success.	One
of	the	problems	is	the	behaviour	of	wind	farms.	Given	this,	additional	controls	would	improve	matters.
National	Grid,	seeing	the	problem	of	needing	to	tell	wind	farms	not	to	produce,	and	faced	with	opposition	to	running
pylons	through	swathes	of	Scottish	and	borders	landscape,	decided	to	build	the	Western	Link,	a	subsea
interconnector	that	does	the	job	of	moving	this	power	to	where	it	is	needed.	Unfortunately,	it	has	been	subject	to
several	significant	failures	over	the	two	years	it	has	been	in	operation.	The	downside	is	that	payments	to	Scottish
wind	farms	to	stop	producing	are	higher	when	the	link	is	not	working.	The	upside	for	research	is	that,	after
controlling	for	other	factors,	we	can	evaluate	how	much	the	link	saves	in	payments	to	Scottish	wind	farms	when	it	is
operating.	The	first	pass	answer	our	research	suggests	is	around	£45	million	a	year	if	it	worked	all	the	time.	This	is
worth	having,	but	pales	beside	the	cost	of	the	interconnector,	said	to	be	around	£1.2	billion.
Why	is	it	not	saving	more?	Here	we	enter	one	of	economists’	favourite	areas,	the	role	of	incentives.	A	naïve	view
would	be	that	when	a	wind	farm	can	produce	it	will,	because	the	wind	is	free.	But	this	neglects	the	subtlety	of	the
system,	in	which	the	incentive	of	a	wind	farm	is	to	maximise	its	revenue.	We	show	that	wind	farms	offer	to	produce
more	relative	to	a	forecast	based	on	wind	speeds	when	the	price	obtained	is	relatively	high,	when	the	penalty	for
failing	to	produce	what	was	offered	is	relatively	low,	and	when	predictions	of	the	price	paid	to	a	farm	forced	to
switch	off	are	high.	In	fact,	the	last	of	these	—	payments	to	persuade	them	to	switch	off	—	have	been	running	at
very	high	levels,	and	continue	to	do	so,	so	that	it	can	be	more	valuable	to	commit	to	produce,	but	be	told	not	to,
than	actually	to	be	paid	for	generating	electricity.
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Is	this	a	purely	domestic	economy	issue,	due	to	the	quirks	of	the	British	system?	Arguably	not.	Britain	is	by	no
means	alone	in	having	a	grid	system	based	on	the	idea	of	bringing	power	from	large	power	stations	located
alongside	major	rivers	to	populations	and	industry	not	far	distant.	Germany	has	found	much	the	same	problem	in	its
rapid	dash	to	install	renewable	energy	from	solar	power	as	well	as	wind.	Converting	the	system	to	a	“new	normal”
of	increased	renewable	power,	for	important	reasons	relating	to	climate	change,	reveals	many	problems	in	its	wake.
Increased	interconnection	is	part	of	the	answer,	but	reforming	the	payments	made	to	operators	is	just	as	urgent.	In
doing	this,	clearly	operators	will	optimise	relative	to	the	constraints	of	the	system.	Solutions	need	to	bear	this	in
mind.
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Notes:
This	blog	post	is	based	on	Do	British	wind	generators	behave	strategicallyin	response	to	the	Western	Link
interconnector?,	Warwick	Economic	Working	Paper	1242,	presented	at	the	European	Economic	Association’s
Annual	Congress,	August	2020.
The	post	expresses	the	views	of	its	author(s),	not	the	position	of	LSE	Business	Review	or	the	London	School
of	Economics.
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